




Crawford and Beyond: Exploring The Future of the
Confrontation Clause in Light of its Past
Article 18
2005
Please Don't Tell My Parents: The Validity of
School Policies Mandating Parental Notification of
a Student's Pregnancy
Melissa Prober
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law Review
by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Melissa Prober, Please Don't Tell My Parents: The Validity of School Policies Mandating Parental Notification of a Student's Pregnancy, 71




Please Don’t Tell My Parents 
THE VALIDITY OF SCHOOL POLICIES MANDATING 
PARENTAL NOTIFICATION OF A STUDENT’S 
PREGNANCY 
School administrators face the difficult task of balancing 
students’ rights against parental rights.  This becomes 
particularly challenging in the area of student health care, 
especially when it concerns sexual activity and reproductive 
issues.  In recent years, some schools confronted with teenage 
pregnancy have enacted policies requiring disclosure to parents 
of a student’s pregnancy status, even if the school learns about 
the pregnancy through confidential communications between 
the pregnant student and school-based health care providers.1  
Such notification policies raise serious concerns regarding the 
violation of students’ rights. 
Recently, in a case of first impression, a judge for the 
Eastern District of New York denied a motion for a preliminary 
injunction to prohibit the Port Washington School District from 
enforcing a policy requiring that parents of pregnant students 
be informed when school officials, including school nurses, 
learn of a student’s pregnancy.2  The court reasoned that the 
U.S. Constitution and state laws do not prevent schools from 
disclosing such information.3 
This Note argues that, notwithstanding the Eastern 
District of New York decision, mandatory disclosure policies do, 
in fact, violate students’ constitutional and statutory rights.  
Moreover, regardless of the legal implications, these policies 
work against community interests by deterring students from 
  
 1 Memorandum from Dr. Geoffrey N. Gordon, Port Washington School 
District, Office of the Superintendent, Re: Reporting Student Pregnancy (Nov. 12, 
2002), Complaint at Ex. A., Port Wash. Teachers’ Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ. of the Port 
Wash. Union Free Sch. Dist., 361 F. Supp. 2d 69 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 04 Civ. 1357) 
[hereinafter Port Washington Memorandum]. 
 2 Port Wash. Teachers’ Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ. of the Port Wash. Union Free 
Sch. Dist., 361 F. Supp. 2d 69, 81 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 3 Id. at 77-81. 
558 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1 
 
using school-based health care providers as a source for 
confidential health care, counseling, and information. 
Section I of this Note explores mandatory notification 
policies, including the one enacted by the Port Washington 
School District, and reviews the Eastern District’s decision in 
Port Washington Teachers’ Association v. Board of Education of 
the Port Washington Union Free School District.  Section II 
argues that mandatory notification policies are 
unconstitutional.  Section III addresses various state and 
federal laws that allow minors to consent to medical and 
mental health care and protect their confidential 
communications.  Section IV examines the conflict between 
mandatory notification policies and sound public policy, 
specifically their potential to deter students from using 
available health care at school and place some adolescents at 
risk of child abuse.  Section V offers recommendations for 
school officials to consider in order to promote school health 
care to adolescents and to protect the confidential 
communications of their students. 
I. HOW MANDATORY NOTIFICATION POLICIES WORK 
Notification policies vary depending on the goals of 
school officials.  Some may only require school-based health 
care providers to reveal the names of pregnant students to 
school administrators.  School officials may use this 
information to provide special care for the student, such as 
elevator access.  However, while some administrators may use 
this information solely to provide adequate accommodations for 
pregnant students, other administrators may seek the names 
of pregnant students to “counsel” them out of school, meaning 
to encourage them to continue their education elsewhere.4 
  
 4 “Counseling out” occurs when pregnant students are told by school 
counselors or administrators that they should attend an alternative school, stay home 
during their pregnancy, or drop out entirely.  See generally Tamara S. Ling, Note, 
Lifting Voices: Towards Equal Education for Pregnant and Parenting Students in New 
York City, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2387 (2000) (explaining how New York’s pregnant 
students are pushed out of regular schools and told they must instead attend inferior 
schools for pregnant and parenting teens).  In Fullerton, California, Mary Beth Holt, a 
counselor for the Bellflower High and Middle School, was allegedly fired for refusing to 
disclose the names of pregnant students to a vice-principal who wanted Holt to counsel 
pregnant students to transfer from Bellflower to an inferior school.  Holt v. Super. Ct., 
No. BC257305, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6135, at *2 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 28, 
2002).  The vice-principal allegedly informed Holt that the policy was a board directive.  
Complaint at 4-5, Holt, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6135 (No. BC257305). 
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Other policies, such as the one enacted by the Port 
Washington School District, go a step further and require5 that 
the parents of the pregnant student be notified regarding that 
student’s pregnancy.  This Note focuses on this latter type of 
policy. 
The Port Washington School District in New York 
enacted a written policy to “clarify the right and responsibility 
of district staff, including school nurses, to inform a student’s 
parents that she is pregnant.”6  The policy warns that “a 
student’s disclosure to any staff member that she is pregnant is 
not a communication protected by a legal privilege, but rather 
may trigger legal reporting obligations depending on the 
circumstances.”7 It instructs staff to refrain from 
“represent[ing] to a student that such a disclosure will be kept 
in confidence” and informs them that any staff member, 
including the school nurse or psychiatrist, who learns about a 
student’s pregnancy should tell the school social worker,8 who 
in turn will encourage the student to reveal her pregnancy to 
her parents.9  If the student agrees to voluntary disclosure, the 
social worker should “confirm that such a disclosure was 
made.”10  If a student refuses to tell her parents about her 
pregnancy, “the social worker should offer to meet with the 
  
 5 At the hearing to determine whether a preliminary injunction should be 
granted, Dr. Geoffrey Gordon, the superintendent of the school district, testified that 
the policy was just a “guideline.”  Transcript of Hearing at 215, Port Wash. Teachers’ 
Ass’n, 361 F. Supp. 2d 81 (No. 04 Civ. 1357).  Thus, the court concluded that the policy 
was not mandatory, but discretionary.  Port Wash. Teachers’ Ass’n, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 
75.  However, by Dr. Gordon’s own interpretation of the policy, it only becomes 
discretionary in situations of “grave concern,” such as where a difficult home situation 
exists.  Transcript of Hearing at 216, Port Wash. Teachers’ Ass’n, 361 F. Supp. 2d 81 
(No. 04 Civ. 1357).  Thus, it follows that in the “typical” situation where a student is 
pregnant and there is no indication of abuse or other such problems,  school-based 
health care providers are required to adhere to the policy and make the required 
notifications.  Therefore, the analysis in this Note focuses on the aspects of the policy 
that are non-discretionary.  Also considered are the facts that minors often do not 
reveal abuse and that a parent’s knowledge of the minor’s pregnancy could lead to the 
first instance of abuse.  See infra Part IV.B.  Moreover, it is argued that when a 
student makes a confidential communication about her pregnancy to a school-based 
health care provider, any disclosure of that communication to a third-party, including a 
school official, violates the student’s rights.  Finally, the purpose of this Note is to 
address mandatory notification policies in general, using the Port Washington policy as 
just one example of a policy that mandates disclosure. 
 6 Port Washington Memorandum, supra note 1. 
 7 Id. 
 8 This policy also applies to communications by the pregnant student made 
directly to the social worker.  Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
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parents and the student to help the student inform her parents 
and/or offer to inform the student’s parents without the student 
being present.”11  If the pregnant student continues to resist 
disclosure to her parents, however, “the social worker should 
inform the student that she/he will inform the parents [and 
a]fter consultation with the Principal and Superintendent, the 
social worker should inform the parents.”12 
Although the memorandum has provisions for suspected 
victims of rape or incest,13 it does not mention the possibility 
that disclosure may not be in the student’s best interest or that 
she may be mature enough to make a decision about her 
pregnancy without the involvement of her parents.  In fact, the 
policy does not make a distinction based on the age of the 
student.  Indeed, seemingly under the policy, an eighteen-year-
old student – an adult under the law14 – would be treated the 
same as a fourteen-year-old student.  Nor are there any 
provisions outlining the process by which a student could 
challenge the notification or appeal the school’s decision to 
disclose her pregnancy to her parents before such a notification 
is made. 
On March 22, 2005, the Eastern District of New York 
denied a motion by the Port Washington Teachers’ Association 
seeking a preliminary injunction to prohibit the enforcement of 
Port Washington’s mandatory notification policy.15  The court 
held, as an initial matter, that the plaintiffs did not have 
standing.16  The court reasoned that “where the Plaintiffs 
purport to bring suit on behalf of a third party, the Plaintiffs 
must still establish the threshold requirement that they have 
  
 11 Id. 
 12 Port Washington Memorandum, supra note 1. 
 13 In cases of rape and incest, the social worker should inform the principal or 
superintendent immediately “so that legally required reporting can be made to the 
appropriate authorities.”  Port Washington Memorandum, supra note 1. 
 14 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2504(1) (McKinney 2005). 
 15 Port Wash. Teachers’ Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ. of the Port Wash. Union Free 
Sch. Dist., 361 F. Supp. 2d 69, 81 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)  The case was filed on March 1, 2004 
by the Port Washington Teachers’ Association, and on September 5, 2004, plaintiffs 
filed a motion for a preliminary injunction.  Id. at 73.  Also on that day, the New York 
Civil Liberties Union Foundation, along with the American Academy of Pediatrics, the 
Association of Reproductive Health Professions, the New York State Association of 
School Nurses, the New York State Nurses Association, the New York State Society for 
Clinical Social Work, and the Society for Adolescent Medicine sought leave from the 
court to file an amici curiae brief, which was granted by the court.  Id.  After a two-day 
evidentiary hearing on the preliminary injunction motion held on November 8-9, 2004, 
the court denied the plaintiffs’ request for a temporary restraining order.  Id. 
 16 Id. at 74. 
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suffered an ‘injury-in-fact’ before asserting the third party’s 
interest.”17  The court went on to hold that the plaintiffs had 
not suffered an injury-in-fact “because they face no 
repercussions from the Policy.”18  The court further held that 
the case was not ripe for judicial review because there was “no 
direct or immediate dilemma.”19 
These holdings alone would have been sufficient 
grounds to deny the issuance of a preliminary injunction.  
However, the court also based its decision on whether the 
plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits.20  The court 
found that they were not.21 
The court examined the constitutionality of the policy 
and held that the cases regarding a minor’s right to an abortion 
without “blanket” parental involvement22 do not apply.23  The 
court concluded that a distinction exists between notification of 
pregnancy and consent or notification for abortion.24  The court 
stated that the “Plaintiffs may not stretch the protections that 
apply to a minor seeking an abortion to cover the disclosure of 
her pregnancy to her parents.”25  It reasoned such parental 
notification “does not intrude on the student’s right to 
ultimately seek an abortion or to carry her fetus to term.”26  
Moreover, the court stated that the school has an 
“unquestioned obligation to inform parents of the conditions 
that affect the health, safety, and welfare of their child.”27 
According to the court, the policy does not violate state 
law or professional confidentiality obligations.28  Moreover, the 
court points to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act 
of 1974 (“FERPA”),29 stating that it “seem[s] to require that a 
school disclose a student’s pregnancy to her parents.”30  The 
court reasoned that the broad definition of “educational 
  
 17 Id. (citation omitted). 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. at 77. 
 20 Port Wash. Teachers’ Ass’n, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 77. 
 21 Id. at 77-81. 
 22 See infra note 45. 
 23 Port Wash. Teachers’ Ass’n, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 78. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at 79. 
 27 Id. at 78 (citing N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 136.3(a)(5) (2005)). 
 28 Port Wash. Teachers’ Ass’n, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 79. 
 29 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2005). 
 30 Port Wash. Teachers’ Ass’n, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 79 (citing § 1232g). 
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records” includes records “evidencing the pregnancy of a 
student.”31 
The court concluded that state statutes regarding public 
health do not create a duty of confidentiality.32  It held that the 
laws discussing abortion or prenatal care are not applicable 
because the policy “does not on its face implicate these 
decisions.”33 
In addition, the court held that “any law dealing with 
confidentiality of records in a hospital is irrelevant to such 
records in a school”34 because the school must act in the 
position of in loco parentis and therefore “must inform parents 
of any relevant information regarding their child.”35  It 
concluded the “if anything, New York State law counsels 
toward disclosure to the parents.”36  Moreover, the court 
concluded that New York law provides for a duty of 
confidentiality for private social workers but that it does not 
apply because the “‘school social worker is a paid employee of 
the school district who does not receive compensation from 
students or their parents.’”37 
Thus, the court decided that the plaintiffs were not 
likely to succeed on the merits38 and concluded that “[n]o facts 
or circumstances of irreparable harm” were present.39  The 
court, therefore, denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary 
injunction.40 
  
 31 Id. at 79-80 (citing § 1232g(a)(4)(A)(i)-(ii)). 
 32 Id. at 80. 
 33 Id. (citing N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 17 (McKinney 2005)); N.Y. PUB. 
HEALTH LAW § 2504(3)) (McKinney 2005). 
 34 Id. (citing N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 405.7(c)(13) (2005)). 
 35 Port Wash. Teachers’ Ass’n, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 80. 
 36 Id. (citing tit. 8, § 136.3(a)(5) (“providing that ‘it is the duty of the trustees 
and boards of education . . . “to advise, in writing, the parent or guardian of each child 
in whom any aspect of the total school health service program indicates a defect, 
disability or other condition which may require professional attention with regard to 
health’”)). 
 37 Id. (quoting Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 31 Ed. Dep’t Rep. 378, 381 (1992), 
available at http://www.counsel.nysed.gov/Decisions/volume31/d12673.htm (indicating 
that plaintiff’s reliance on N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4508 (McKinney 2005) was incorrect)). 
 38 Id. at 77. 
 39 Id. at 81. 
 40 Port Wash. Teachers’ Ass’n, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 81. 
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II. MANDATORY NOTIFICATION POLICIES VIOLATE PREGNANT 
STUDENTS’ CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY 
The Eastern District rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that 
minors have a constitutional right to privacy regarding 
pregnancy.41  It concluded that the case law regarding parental 
notification of a minor’s abortion is not applicable in the 
context of notification of a pregnancy.42  This analysis does not 
withstand scrutiny.  Pregnancy and abortion are inextricably 
linked and the right to an abortion means nothing if the law 
can be circumvented by requiring the disclosure of a minor’s 
pregnancy to her parents. 
Mandatory notification policies do, in fact, violate young 
women’s constitutional right to privacy by eliminating their 
right to seek an abortion without parental involvement.  
Indeed, if a school requires notification of a student’s 
pregnancy to her parents, it simultaneously eliminates her 
right to seek an abortion free from parental involvement.  
While traditional common law prohibits a minor from 
consenting to medical care,43 the Supreme Court has created 
exceptions that allow minors to consent to certain types of 
reproductive health care, such as contraception and abortion.44  
Under Bellotti v. Baird and its progeny, minors are able to 
consent to an abortion without “blanket” parental 
  
 41 Id. at 79. 
 42 Id. at 78 (“The Policy at issue here does not even address abortion, but 
merely provides for notification of a student’s pregnancy.”). 
 43 See generally JAMES M. MORRISSEY ET. AL., CONSENT AND 
CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE HEALTH CARE OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 1-6 (1986) 
(describing the historical perspective of the parent-child relationship).  A minor 
traditionally has been dependent upon her parents, possessing no legal rights of her 
own until she reaches the age of maturity.  Id.  Although the past century has seen an 
expansion of the legal rights of minors, the law still generally reflects society’s belief 
that children are unable to maturely and intelligently make complicated decisions and, 
therefore, benefit from parental involvement and experience, particularly when making 
medical choices.  ROGER J.R. LEVESQUE, ADOLESCENTS, SEX, AND THE LAW 78 (2000).  
However, a number of exceptions allow minors to consent to medical treatment, 
depending on the type of health care and the circumstances.  Id. at 77-80.  For 
example, a doctor may treat a minor in a medical emergency, and a minor may consent 
to medical care if she is legally emancipated.  J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Grounded in the 
Reality of Their Lives: Listening to Teens Who Make the Abortion Decision Without 
Involving Their Parents, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 61, 72, 74 (2003).  Moreover, some 
states allow “mature minors” to consent to medical treatment.  Id. at 69.  Significantly, 
a large number of states permit minors to consent on their own to at least some type of 
reproductive health care.  See The Alan Guttmacher Inst., State Policies in Brief: 
Minors’ Access to Contraceptive Services, http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/ 
spibs/spib_MACS.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2005). 
 44 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979). 
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involvement45 because a state may not grant a third-person 
absolute veto power over a patient’s abortion decision.46  
Indeed, minors must be afforded the opportunity to go before a 
neutral, detached decision-maker to seek an abortion free from 
any sort of parental involvement.  Thus, policies that require 
parental notification of a student’s pregnancy, yet do not  
provide the student with the required judicial bypass 
procedure, effectuate an unconstitutional regime because they 
take away the ability of the student to seek an abortion without 
the involvement of a third-party. 
The Supreme Court’s expansion of the constitutional 
right of privacy to minors47 flows from the Court’s holdings that 
the penumbras of the Fourteenth Amendment grant men and 
women a constitutional right to privacy and bodily integrity.48  
  
 45 See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 417 
(1983) [hereinafter Akron I] (following Bellotti by invalidating a consent statute that 
made “a blanket determination that all minors under the age of 15 are too immature to 
make an abortion decision or that an abortion never may be in the minor’s best 
interests without parental approval”); Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643 (striking down a 
requirement for parental consent unless an expeditious, confidential alternative with 
other safeguards was provided); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 
(1977) (holding that the State may not impose a “blanket prohibition” or “a blanket 
requirement of parental consent” on a minor’s abortion decision); Planned Parenthood 
of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (prohibiting a blanket provision, such 
as spousal or parental consent, because the State lacks the constitutional authority to 
grant a third-person an absolute, and potentially arbitrary, veto over a patient’s 
abortion decision). 
 46 Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74. 
 47 Carey, 431 U.S. at 693 (holding that a statute prohibiting the sale of 
contraceptives to minors was unconstitutional because the “right to privacy in 
connection with decisions affecting procreation extends to minors as well as to adults”). 
See also Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 633 n.12; Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74 (“Constitutional rights 
do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined 
age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and 
possess constitutional rights.”). 
  In addition to the right of privacy, the Court has found that minors possess 
equal protection rights, procedural due process protection, and a right to freedom of 
speech. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 676 (1977) (holding that minors possess a 
liberty interest in procedural safeguards that minimize the risk of wrongful 
punishment); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975) (holding that public school 
students are entitled to notice and a formal hearing prior to suspension); In re Winship, 
397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (holding that minors may be guilty only upon proof of a 
reasonable doubt and that they may assert the privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) 
(holding that minor students are “persons” under the Constitution); In re Gault, 387 
U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (“[N]either the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill or Rights is for 
adults alone.”). 
 48 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 
438 (1972) (finding that a law prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to 
unmarried individuals violates the Equal Protect Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (declaring that a law 
prohibiting the use of contraceptives by married couples is unconstitutional). 
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This right of privacy encompasses a woman’s interest in 
independently making certain important decisions,49 including 
whether to bear a child, which is “at the very heart of th[e] 
cluster of constitutionally protected choices.”50 
In the landmark decision of Roe v. Wade, the Court 
balanced a woman’s abortion decision with the State’s interest 
in protecting the woman’s health and the potential life of the 
fetus.51  The Court held that the Constitution protects the right 
to choose prior to fetal viability, and, therefore, the government 
may not prohibit or regulate abortions before viability.52  After 
the first trimester of a woman’s pregnancy – the point when, 
according to the Court’s analysis, the fetus becomes viable – 
the State may regulate abortions in order to promote its 
interest in maternal health in ways that are “reasonably 
related” to the health of the mother.53  Under this analysis, the 
State may also regulate, and even proscribe, abortions after 
viability to promote its interest in the potential of human life, 
except where an abortion is necessary to protect the life or 
health of the mother.54 
Two decades later in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,55 the Court articulated the 
undue burden standard where, in some instances, the State’s 
interest in protecting potential life is compelling after fetal 
viability.56 Before viability, however, the State may not prohibit 
abortion or impose a “substantial obstacle” to a woman’s right 
to choose.57 
The State’s interest in protecting minors allows the 
State to limit a minor’s access to abortion in ways not tolerated 
if applied to adults.58  In his plurality opinion in Bellotti, 
  
 49 Carey, 431 U.S. at 684. 
 50 Id. at 685. 
 51 Roe, 410 U.S. at 155. 
 52 Id. at 163. 
 53 Id. at 164. 
 54 Id. at 164-65. 
 55 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 56 Id. at 876-77. 
 57 Id. at 877. If the purpose or effect of a law places a substantial obstacle in 
the path of women who want an abortion before the fetus reaches viability, an undue 
burden exists, and such a statute is unconstitutional. Id. 
 58 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (explaining that “although 
children generally are protected by the same constitutional deprivations as are adults, 
the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to account for children’s vulnerability 
and their needs against constitutional deprivations for ‘concern, . . . sympathy, 
and . . . paternal attention’”) (citation omitted). See also Carey v. Population Servs. 
Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 (1977) (“State restrictions inhibiting privacy rights of minors 
 
566 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1 
 
Justice Powell explained that the constitutional rights of 
minors are not equal with those of adults for three reasons: 
“the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make 
critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the 
importance of the parental role in child rearing.”59  Still, the 
decision to have an abortion greatly differs from other choices 
made during minority.  Thus, Justice Powell concluded that the 
uniqueness of abortion and the importance of the constitutional 
right of privacy requires the State to act with “particular 
sensitivity” when enacting legislation mandating parental 
involvement in a minor’s abortion decision.60  Observing that 
“there are few situations in which denying a minor the right to 
make an important decision will have consequences so grave 
and indelible,”61 the plurality recognized the danger that 
parents may obstruct the minor’s choice in such a significant 
matter.62 
The Supreme Court, therefore, limits the extent to 
which a State may infringe upon a minor’s right to privacy, 
particularly by prohibiting “blanket” parental involvement in a 
minor’s pregnancy.63  Under Bellotti and subsequent cases, the 
Supreme Court has held that parental consent64 and 
notification65 laws do not impose an undue burden on minors 
  
are valid only if they serve ‘any significant state interest that is not present in the case 
of an adult.’”) (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75 (1976)). 
 59 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634. The statute challenged in Bellotti required 
consent of the minor’s parents or judicial approval for the abortion in a proceeding in 
which a court determined whether an abortion was in the best interests of the minor, 
without considering whether the minor was mature enough to make an informed 
abortion decision. Id. at 625-26.  The Court held that the statute was unconstitutional 
because it unduly burdens the right to seek an abortion.  Id. at 651. 
 60 Id. at 642. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 647 (explaining that because “many parents hold strong views on the 
subject of abortion, and young pregnant minors, especially those living at home, are 
particularly vulnerable to their parents’ efforts to obstruct both an abortion and their 
access to court[, i]t would be unrealistic . . . to assume that the mere existence of a legal 
right to seek relief in superior court provides an effective avenue of relief for some of 
those who need it the most”). 
 63 See supra note 45. 
 64 Parental consent laws require one or both parents to provide actual 
consent for a minor to have an abortion. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 
507 (1990) [hereinafter Akron II]; Planned Parenthood of Kan. City v. Ashcroft, 462 
U.S. 476, 479 n.4 (1983); Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 625; Danforth, 428 U.S. at 58. 
 65 Parental notification laws require the minor, the minor’s doctor or other 
health care providers to notify one or both parents of the minor’s abortion decision 
prior to the abortion. Usually, accompanying these laws is a twenty-four to forty-eight 
hour wait period after the notification and before the minor may undergo an abortion. 
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seeking an abortion if the law also grants the minor the 
opportunity to an expeditious, anonymous bypass procedure 
before a neutral decision-maker where she can demonstrate 
that she is mature enough to make the abortion decision on her 
own, or, if not, that an abortion is nevertheless in her best 
interests. 66 
Although the Court has not decided whether a law 
requiring the notification of just one parent must include a 
bypass procedure,67 the Court has noted that a bypass 
procedure that passes the constitutional requirements 
necessary for a valid consent statute will suffice for a notice 
statute,68 and nearly all lower courts have required a bypass 
procedure for a notice statute.69  Arguably, a judicial bypass 
procedure is necessary to protect minors’ rights even where 
notification of only one parent is required by law.70 
Therefore, it follows that if a student discloses in a 
confidential conversation with a school-based health care 
  
See, e.g., Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 293 (1997); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 
U.S. 417, 422 (1990); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 412 n.21 (1981). 
 66 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643. In a concurrence in Ashcroft, Justice Powell 
further discussed the standard required in a judicial bypass procedure. Ashcroft, 462 
U.S. at 490-93.  A majority of the Court explicitly adopted the Bellotti bypass criteria in 
Akron II, 497 U.S. at 511-14.  See also Hodgson, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (extending judicial 
bypass requirements to two-parent notification laws). 
 67 Lambert, 520 U.S. at 295 (citing Akron II, 497 U.S. at 510). See, e.g., 
Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 762 A.2d 620, 629 (N.J. 2000). Indeed, the 
Court has not articulated in a majority opinion the “precise extent to which a minor 
female’s abortion choices can be subject to a requirement of parental notification or 
parental consent.” JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 892 
(6th ed. 2000). 
 68 Akron II, 497 U.S. at 511. In fact, a bypass provision that satisfies the 
standard for a consent procedure as set out in Bellotti satisfies, a fortiori, any criteria 
that may be constitutionally required for a parental notification statute. Lambert, 520 
U.S. at 295. 
 69 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452, 
1460 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that one parent notification law without a bypass is 
facially unconstitutional); Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health v. Slaby, 854 F.2d 852, 861 
(6th Cir. 1988) (same); Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 763 F.2d 1532, 1539-44 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(holding unconstitutional parental notice law whose bypass did not meet Bellotti 
requirements), aff’d, 484 U.S. 171 (1987); Ind. Planned Parenthood Affiliates Ass’n v. 
Pearson, 716 F.2d 1127, 1132 (7th Cir. 1983); cf. Planned Parenthood of the Blue Ridge 
v. Camblos, 155 F.3d 352, 375-77 (4th Cir. 1998) (relying on bypass to find statute 
provided abused minors protection required under Hodgson); Causeway Med. Suite v. 
Ieyoub, 109 F.3d 1096, 1109-12 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding one-parent consent law 
unconstitutional where law permitted parental notification if court denied bypass). 
 70 Miller, 63 F.3d at 1460-62.  See, e.g., Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 464-79 
(Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (describing 
the psychological impact of compelled notification and the health risks of delay in 
receiving an abortion); Matheson, 450 U.S. at 437-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(recognizing that the “threat of parental notice” endangers minors’ health, leads to 
delays, self-administered abortions, or illegal abortions, or forces minors to give birth). 
568 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1 
 
provider that she is pregnant, the provider – or any public 
school official who learns of the pregnancy through these 
confidential communications – may not notify her parents of 
her pregnancy because to do so would take away the minor’s 
ability to have an abortion without parental involvement via a 
judicial bypass procedure.  Indeed, “every minor must have the 
opportunity – if she so desires – to go directly to a court 
without first consulting or notifying her parents.”71  The 
decision in Port Washington Teachers’ Association ignores this 
rule, and the court misinterprets the constitutional precedents 
when it states that “[p]arental notification of a student’s 
pregnancy does not intrude on the student’s right to ultimately 
seek an abortion or to carry her fetus to term.”72 
Thus, for a mandatory notification policy to withstand 
constitutional scrutiny, the school district would have to 
provide an expeditious, confidential bypass procedure where 
the pregnant student could demonstrate that she is mature 
enough to make a reproductive medical decision on her own or, 
even if she is not, that an abortion is in her best interests.73  
Moreover, school officials themselves arguably could not 
administer the bypass procedure since it must be conducted by 
an independent, neutral decision-maker.74  Finally, the 
pregnant student would be entitled to representation during 
the bypass proceeding75 and to an appeal if the bypass is 
denied.76  Needless to say, those requirements are beyond the 
scope of the school officials’ duties and would prove difficult to 
administer within the school system in a manner that is 
constitutionally permissible. 
  
 71 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 647.  Naturally, states without parental consent or 
notification laws do not have a judicial bypass procedure in place.  See The Alan 
Guttmacher Inst., State Policies in Brief: Parental Involvement in Minors’ Abortions, 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_PIMA.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 
2005) for an overview of parental involvement laws in each state.  Thus, in states like 
New York where no judicial bypass procedure exists, a school cannot effectuate a 
notification policy without also creating a bypass system that passes constitutional 
muster. 
 72 Port Wash. Teachers’ Ass’n, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 79 
 73 See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 74 Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 492 n.20 (1983); Miller, 63 
F.3d at 1461-62. 
 75 Pearson, 716 F.2d at 1137-38; Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Neely, 804 
F. Supp. 1210, 1218 (D. Ariz. 1992) (observing that statute was unlikely to ensure 
access to judicial bypass without providing for either a court-appointed attorney, 
appointment of a guardian ad litem, or the ability of a minor to proceed through a 
“next friend”). 
 76 Pearson, 716 F.2d at 1134-36. 
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III. STATUTORY LAW: MINORS’ RIGHT TO CONSENT AND 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
In addition to the constitutional limitations placed on 
mandatory notification policies, depending on the state, laws 
may prohibit school-based health care professionals from 
disclosing the names of pregnant students to third-parties, 
including the students’ parents.  If state law grants minors the 
ability to consent to certain kinds of medical and mental health 
care, then communications or information revealed by the 
treatment must remain confidential.  Thus, the student 
engaging in confidential communications must consent to any 
disclosures of confidential information to third parties, 
including her parents or school officials.77 
As a result of legislative policy decisions that place the 
health of young adults above parents’ right to involvement, 
minors are typically given the right to consent to care related 
to reproductive health, alcohol and substance abuse, and 
mental health.78  Twenty-seven states and Washington, D.C. 
have laws or policies that specifically allow pregnant minors to 
receive prenatal care and delivery services without parental 
consent or notification.79  In New York, pregnant minors can 
  
 77 See infra note 88 and accompanying text.  Of course, this does not apply to 
the special circumstances where disclosure is required by statute, such as in the case of 
child abuse.  See infra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 78 The Alan Guttmacher Inst., Lawmakers Grapple with Parents’ Role in 
Teen Access to Reproductive Health Care (1995), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/ 
ib6.html (explaining that “[o]ver the last 20-30 years . . . states have recognized that, in 
fact, many minors are capable of making informed decisions about medical care and 
that confidentiality can be essential to encouraging young people to address sensitive 
health concerns in a timely manner”). 
  For example, the exception that allows minors to consent to medical 
treatment of sexually transmitted infections is not based on minors’ maturity or 
decision-making skills, but as a result of the growing incidents of sexually transmitted 
diseases among minors and the assumption that they would not seek treatment if they 
were required to first notify their parents.  Christine M. Hanisco, Note, Acknowledging 
the Hypocrisy: Granting Minors the Right to Choose Their Medical Treatment, 16 
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 889, 912 (2000); MORRISSEY, supra note 43, at 61-62 
(explaining the public policy reasons why almost every state allows minors to consent 
to treatment related to the diagnosis and treatment of sexually transmitted diseases 
and arguing that the policy would not be served if parental notification was required).  
See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 6926 (Deering 2005) (allowing minors twelve years in age or 
older to consent to the diagnosis and treatment of sexually transmitted diseases); N.Y. 
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2504(2) (McKinney 2005) (allowing minors to consent to treatment 
of sexually transmitted diseases without parental involvement). 
 79 The Alan Guttmacher Inst., State Policies in Brief: Minors’ Access to 
Prenatal Care, http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MAPC.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 10, 2005); Heather Boonstra & Elizabeth Nash, The Alan Guttmacher 
Inst., Minors and the Right to Consent to Health Care, 3 GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. 
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consent on their own to all “medical, dental, health and 
hospital services relating to prenatal care.”80  Pennsylvania 
allows any minor who “has been pregnant” to consent to 
medical, dental and health services for herself, even without 
the consent of the minor’s parents or any other person.81  
Minors in California may consent to medical care relating to 
the prevention or treatment of pregnancy.82  Moreover, a recent 
opinion by California’s Attorney General advised that school 
districts may not require students to get written parental 
consent prior to releasing the student from school to receive 
confidential medical services nor may the school adopt a policy 
of notifying a parent when a student leaves school to obtain 
confidential medical services.83  Even in states with laws 
requiring parental consent or notification before a minor can 
obtain an abortion, minors are usually able to consent to 
confidential, minor medical procedures, such as pregnancy 
testing and related counseling,84 which would include such 
services provided by school-based health care providers.85 
Moreover, a student’s disclosure to a school-based 
health care provider that she is pregnant may be protected by 
laws allowing minors to consent to mental health care.  As of 
2000, laws in twenty states and Washington, D.C. grant minors 
explicit authority to consent to outpatient mental health 
  
POL’Y 4, 5 (Aug. 2000), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/ 
ib_minors_00.html. 
 80 § 2504(3).  Indeed, “[e]ven in the absence of a specific statute, however, 
minors probably have a constitutionally protected privacy right to consent to sex-
related health care, and thus there is little doubt that a minor may consent to 
pregnancy-related health care – assuming, of course, that the minor can give informed 
consent.”  MORRISSEY, supra note 43, at 64.  The New York Civil Liberties Union 
argues that since “prenatal care” is construed broadly, almost all necessary health care 
that a pregnant minor may seek – including counseling by a social worker or 
psychologist – can be considered “prenatal care.”  Memorandum from the N.Y. Civil 
Liberties Union Reprod. Rights Project, Student Pregnancies Are Not Reportable to 
School Officials or to Parents (March 25, 2003) [hereinafter Student Pregnancies Are 
Not Reportable].  See also MORRISSEY, supra note 43, at 64 (stating that while most 
state statutes do not define prevention and treatment of pregnancy, pregnancy testing, 
pelvic examinations, and prenatal care would be included). 
 81 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 10101 (2005). 
 82 CAL. FAM. CODE § 6925 (Deering 2005). 
 83 87 Op. Att’y Gen. Cal. 168 (2004), 2004 Cal. AG LEXIS 37, at *6, 15. 
 84 For example, Virginia law requires parental consent before a minor may 
receive an abortion, VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(V) (2005), but allows minors to consent 
to “medical and health services required in case of birth control, pregnancy or family 
planning,” VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2969(E)(2) (2005). 
 85 Since school-based health care professionals do not provide abortions, state 
laws requiring parental involvement prior to a minor’s abortion are not implicated. 
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services.86  For example, in California, minors may consent to 
outpatient mental health treatment or counseling, including 
services performed by a licensed educational psychologist or a 
credentialed school psychologist.87 
Once it has been determined that a minor has the right 
and capacity to consent to certain health care and counseling, 
any information relating to that care must remain 
confidential.88  Confidentiality, which “refers to the privileged 
and private nature of the information provided during the 
health care transaction,” serves as the “cornerstone” of the 
health care provider-patient relationship.89  It is vital to 
establish trust between the patient and her health care 
professional and encourages the patient to disclose full and 
accurate information.90 
Some states specifically require by statute that certain 
health care professionals maintain the confidentiality of their 
patients.  In New York, for example, confidentiality laws apply 
to those authorized to practice medicine, registered as 
professional nurses, licensed as practical nurses, psychologists, 
and certified social workers, among other health care 
providers.91  In addition, medical records regarding a minor’s 
  
 86 Boonstra & Nash, supra note 79, at 5.  
 87 CAL. FAM. CODE § 6924 (Deering 2005). 
 88 See MORRISSEY, supra note 43, at 17 (explaining that minors’ ability to 
keep health care confidential from their parents naturally flows from their ability to 
consent to such treatment); see also Ehrlich, supra note 43, at 70 (discussing that the 
provider’s duty of confidentiality flows to the party consenting to the medical care). 
 89 Council on Sci. Aff., Am. Med. Ass’n, Confidential Health Services for 
Adolescents, 11 JAMA 1420, 1420 (1993) [hereinafter Confidential Health Services for 
Adolescents]. 
 90 Id.  See discussion infra Part IV.A. (discussing the benefits and necessity of 
promising confidentiality to students seeking health care). 
 91 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4504(a) (McKinney 2005) (privilege of medical records for 
physicians, nurses), 4507 (psychologists), 4508 (social workers); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & 
REGS. tit. 8, § 29.1(8) (2005); N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 6509(9), 6511 (McKinney 2003) 
(disclosure of communications obtained in professional capacity by members of various 
professions certified by New York State, including medicine, social work, psychology 
and nursing, constitutes professional misconduct). 
  The New York law applying to social workers provides an example.  See 
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4508 (McKinney 2005).  In Port Washington Teachers’ Association, the 
court held that communications between a student and a school social worker are not 
privileged.  Port Wash. Teachers’ Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ. of the Port Wash. Union Free 
Sch. Dist., 361 F. Supp. 2d 69, 80 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 31 Ed. 
Dep’t Rep. 378, 380 (1992)).  The court states in its analysis that the “school social 
worker is a paid employee of the school district who does not receive compensation 
from students or their parents.  No decision of the courts or the Commissioner of 
Education has yet granted privilege status to communication between a student and 
school personnel.”  Id. at 80 (quoting Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 31 Ed. Dep’t Rep. at 380).  It 
should first be noted that the opinion quoted here is not a court opinion as the Port 
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abortion or sexually transmitted disease may not be released or 
disclosed to her parents without the minor’s consent.92  
California law provides extensive protection for minors’ 
communications with care providers with a statute protecting 
information of a “personal nature” disclosed to a school 
counselor by students twelve years of age or older.93 
Federal law provides additional safeguards.  When 
federal drug and alcohol funding supports a school counselor’s 
position, even in part, the counselor is bound by federal laws 
requiring stringent protection of clients’ confidentiality.94  
Moreover, when a student receives any treatment from such a 
counselor, including treatment unrelated to substance abuse, 
the communications and information relating to the treatment 
must remain confidential.95  Because confidentiality generally 
follows consent,96 if a student is able to consent to certain 
medical and mental health care, the provider must follow 
normal confidentiality rules. 
FERPA does not change the analysis.  In Port 
Washington Teachers’ Association, the court relied on FERPA 
for the proposition that FERPA requires that schools disclose a 
  
Washington Teachers’ Association court suggests but a Board of Education 
Commissioner decision.  Id. (misidentifying the quoted opinion as one coming from a 
“Court”). 
  Moreover, courts construe the term “client,” as it applies in an analysis 
regarding privilege, to refer to the individual who is consulting with the social worker 
in the social worker’s professional capacity.  See Lichtenstein v. Montefiore Hosp. & 
Med. Ctr., 392 N.Y.S.2d 18, 21 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977) (concluding that a wife’s 
conversations with husband’s social worker are not privileged); see also People v. Bass, 
529 N.Y.S.2d 961, 963-64 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988).  Therefore, a child is considered the 
social worker’s client when the child is the “chief party in interest of the social 
worker . . . .”  People v. Easter, 395 N.Y.S.2d 926, 930 (Albany County Ct. 1977).  The 
factors used in determining whether a person is a social worker’s client include: 
1) whether the social worker is asked to assess the individual’s mental health issues; 
2) whether the individual intends for her statements to be confidential; and 3) whether 
the social worker is being asked to treat or recommend treatment for the individual.  
Bass, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 963-64. 
 92 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 17 (McKinney 2005). 
 93 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49602 (Deering 2005). Furthermore, school counselors 
are prohibited from releasing such confidential information to the student’s parents 
when the counselor “has reasonable cause to believe that the disclosure would result in 
a clear and present danger to the health, safety, or welfare of the pupil.” Id. § 49602(e). 
The statute specifically protects school counselors from incurring “any civil or criminal 
liability as a result of keeping that information confidential.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 94 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2(a)-(b) (2005).  
 95 Comm’r of Soc. Servs. v. David R.S., 436 N.E.2d 451, 453-55 (N.Y. 1981). 
 96 Ehrlich, supra note 43, at 70. Therefore, “the provider’s duty to maintain 
confidentiality flows to the party who consents to the medical care.” Id. 
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student’s pregnancy to her parents.97  However, FERPA 
pertains only to “education records” and not to oral 
communications to a school nurse, counselor, psychologist, or 
social worker.98  Also, FERPA does not apply to records of 
students aged eighteen years of age or older.99 
Importantly, the court’s analysis fails to consider that 
FERPA does not impose an affirmative reporting requirement 
on the school.  Instead, it only applies when parents request 
their children’s educational records and merely directs that 
federal funding be denied to institutions that do not follow its 
dictates.100  As such, FERPA does not trump the laws of any 
state.  Thus, when attempting to determine the substance of 
the law regarding communications between students and 
school nurses, counselors, psychologists and social workers in 
states like New York, FERPA is irrelevant. 
In sum, in many states, health care professionals may 
only disclose the student’s confidential communications and 
disclosures to a third party – including parents or school 
officials – if the student consents to the release101 or unless 
otherwise required by law.102  A policy requiring that providers 
  
 97 Port Wash. Teachers’ Ass’n, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 79-80 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 
1232g (2005)). 
 98 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(A) (defining “education records” as “records, files, 
documents, and other materials which (i) contain information directly related to a 
student; and (ii) are maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a person 
acting for such agency or institution.”).   
 99 Id. § 1232g(a)(4)(B)(iv). 
 100 Id. § 1232g(a)(1)(A) (“No funds shall be made available under any 
applicable program to any educational agency or institution which has a policy of 
denying, or which effectively prevents, the parents of students who are or have been in 
attendance at a school of such agency or at such institution, as the case may be, the 
right to inspect and review the education records of their children . . . . Each 
educational agency or institution shall establish appropriate procedures for the 
granting of a request by parents for access to the education records of their children 
within a reasonable period of time, but in no case more than forty-five days after the 
request has been made.”).   
 101 Id. 
 102 For example, in New York, a school-based health care provider may be 
required to disclose a pregnancy status if she suspects abuse of the student by a 
parent, guardian, N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 413(1) (McKinney 2005), or school employee, 
N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 1125 (McKinney 2005); if the student discloses her intent to harm 
herself or another or commit a crime, N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 33.13(c)(6) (McKinney 
2005) (allowing psychologists and psychiatrists to breach confidentiality to notify an 
endangered person and/or the police if a patient presents a serious and imminent 
danger to that individual), N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4508(a)(2) (McKinney 2005) (permitting social 
workers to not treat communications made to them that indicate an intent to commit a 
crime or harmful act as confidential); or if the student has committed a dangerous 
school-related crime, N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2801 (McKinney 2005) (requiring school board 
to establish procedures for the reporting of violent incidents that take place on or near 
school property and/or at school functions); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, 
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disclose the pregnancy status of students to third parties, when 
the provider learned about the pregnancy through confidential 
communications, generally runs afoul of federal law and state 
law in a number of states. 
IV. PUBLIC POLICY COUNSELS AGAINST MANDATORY 
NOTIFICATION POLICIES 
Mandatory notification policies are not only legally 
problematic, they are also adverse to sound public policy.  
Indeed, such policies deter students from receiving necessary 
and available health care, do not necessarily improve family 
communications, put some students at risk of abuse, and 
unfairly restrict mature adolescents from making an abortion 
decision without parental involvement. 
A. Promising Confidentiality Encourages the Use of School-
Based Health Care Providers 
The promise of confidentiality is critical to establish 
trust between a patient and her health care provider.103  This is 
no different for minors.  When deciding whether to consult with 
a health care provider, confidentiality is one of the most 
important factors considered by minors seeking care for 
reproductive health issues, including pregnancy.104  Teenagers 
are reluctant to seek certain types of medical care if their 
  
§ 100.2(gg) (2003) (including weapons possession or use; homicide; assault or 
harassment; sex crimes; use or possession of drugs or alcohol; theft; burglary; bomb 
threats; and arson among those crimes reportable under this law), and the professional 
is unable to report the situation without revealing the confidential communications 
that the minor is pregnant. 
  However, school boards and health care providers must understand that 
the mere fact that a minor engages in sexual activity (as evidenced by a pregnancy or 
otherwise) does not establish a reasonable suspicion of child abuse. See N.Y. CIVIL 
LIBERTIES UNION REPROD. RIGHTS PROJECT, CHILD ABUSE REPORTING AND TEEN 
SEXUAL ACTIVITY: CLARIFYING SOME COMMON MISCONCEPTIONS (May 2003), 
http://www.nyclu.org/child_abuse_qa_051603.pdf.  
 103 See Valerie J. Gilchrist, Preventive Health Care for the Adolescent, 43 AM. 
FAM. PHYSICIAN 869, 869-78 (1991). 
 104 See, e.g., Jeannie S. Thrall et al., Confidentiality and Adolescents - Use of 
Providers for Health Information for Pelvic Examinations, 154 ARCHIVES OF 
PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 885, 888-91 (2000); Laurie S. Zabin & Samuel D. 
Clark, Jr., Institutional Factors Affecting Teenagers’ Choice and Reasons for Delay in 
Attending a Family Planning Clinic, 15 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 25, 26 (1983) (finding that 
“doesn’t tell parents” was the most important reason why teenagers chose a particular 
family planning clinic for birth control); Laurie S. Zabin et al., Reasons for Delay in 
Contraceptive Clinic Utilization: Adolescent Clinic and Non-Clinic Populations 
Compared, 12 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH CARE 225, 229 (1991). 
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parents have access to information about their medical 
treatment.105  Conversely, adolescents are most likely to utilize 
the medical and mental health services available to them at 
school if they are confident that their providers will not reveal 
their need for care and treatment to school officials and their 
parents.106  Thus, mandatory notification policies deter students 
from seeking health care and counseling available to them at 
school.  Since schools provide the easiest access to medical care 
for teens – one of the most important factors when teens decide 
where to go for reproductive health services107 – without the 
guarantee of confidentiality, many pregnant students will forgo 
seeking advice and treatment from any health care providers 
whatsoever.108 
Medical professionals agree.  The American Medical 
Association, the American Public Health Association, the 
  
 105 See Carol A. Ford et al., Influence of Physician Confidentiality Assurances 
on Adolescents’ Willingness to Disclose Information and Seek Future Health Care, 278 
JAMA 1029, 1029 (1997) [hereinafter Influence of Physician Confidentiality 
Assurances]; Diane M. Reddy et al., Effect of Mandatory Parental Notification on 
Adolescent Girls’ Use of Sexual Health Care Services, 288 JAMA 710, 713 (2002).  Some 
surveys have revealed that for adolescents with a history of foregoing health care, the 
leading reason for not getting the necessary services was not wanting their parents to 
know about their treatment.  Carol A. Ford et al., Foregone Health Care Among 
Adolescents, 282 JAMA 2227, 2228 (1999) (citing studies conducted by the 
Commonwealth Fund).  Another study found that nearly one-fifth of adolescents had 
declined past treatment out of fear that their parents would find out.  Influence of 
Physician Confidentiality Assurances, supra, at 1032. 
 106 Influence of Physician Confidentiality Assurances, supra note 105, at 1032; 
Nancy Rapparort, Psychiatric Consultation to School-based Health Centers:  Lessons 
Learned in an Emerging Field, 40 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 
1473, 1473-75 (2001). 
 107 Zabin & Clark, supra note 104, at 25-26 (finding that “doesn’t tell parents” 
was the most important reason why teenagers chose a particular family planning clinic 
for birth control). 
 108 John Loxterman, Adolescent Access to Confidential Health Services, (July 
1997), http://www.advocatesforyouth.org/publications/iag/confhlth.htm.  In addition, 
assurances of confidentiality increased the likelihood of future visits.  Influence of 
Physician Confidentiality Assurances, supra note 105, at 1033.  In one study, over two-
thirds of adolescents who were promised confidentiality by a physician reported that 
they would seek additional care from that doctor.  Id.  However, of those minors who 
were not assured confidentiality, only 53% said they would return to see the physician.  
Id. 
  In addition, once a school has a reputation for breaching medical 
confidence, a chilling effect on other areas of school-based care may occur.  As the 
student body realizes that certain private communications can be disclosed without 
their consent, students needing treatment for substance abuse, sexually transmitted 
diseases, and psychological problems are more likely to forgo care.  Indeed, distrust 
among the student population will lead to decreased use of school-based health care 
professionals, and potentially all providers.  Thus, notification policies will impair care 
even in those areas where no disclosure is required, such as drug and alcohol 
counseling. 
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Society for Adolescent Medicine, and the American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists “recognize that confidentiality 
is essential to ensure that adolescents have meaningful access 
to reproductive health care services.”109  In addition, the 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the 
American Academy of Pediatrics, and the American Academy 
of Family Physicians believe that minors are entitled to the 
same degree of confidentiality as adult patients.110  The 
American Academy of Pediatrics’ Committee of Adolescence 
warns that “[l]egislation mandating parental involvement does 
not achieve the intended benefit of promoting family 
communication, but it does increase the risk of harm to the 
adolescent by delaying access to appropriate medical care.”111  
Thus, professional health care organizations advocate that 
parental involvement in a minor’s pregnancy should be 
encouraged, not compelled. 
As the previous paragraphs reveal, mandatory 
notification policies simply do not make good policy.  A better 
policy is to guarantee confidentiality between students and all 
staff members – from teachers to counselors to nurses – in 
regard to sensitive areas, such as a pregnancy.  Once the 
decision has been made to provide school-based health care to 
students, the school policy that naturally follows is one that 
encourages students to receive treatment and advice from 
knowledgeable professionals.112  Confidentiality provides this 
incentive.  Without it, students will avoid school-based health 
care and will instead rely on advice from their adolescent 
friends, who have limited perspectives on the sensitive and 
complex problem of teenage pregnancy. 
B. Students Should Decide When to Confide in Their 
Parents 
Ultimately, the pregnant student is in the best position 
to decide whether disclosing her pregnancy to a parent would 
be beneficial.  School officials may argue that they have a duty 
  
 109 Ehrlich, supra note 43, at 70-71. 
 110 Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, Am. Med. Ass’n, Mandatory Parental 
Consent to Abortion, 269 JAMA 82, 84 (1993) [hereinafter Mandatory Parental Consent 
to Abortion]. 
 111 Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Comm. on Adolescence, The Adolescent Right to 
Confidential Care When Considering Abortion, 97 PEDIATRICS 746, 746 (1996) 
[hereinafter Adolescent Right to Confidential Care]. 
 112 See infra Part V. 
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to disclose such information because parents have the right to 
be involved in the upbringing of their children.113  However, the 
Constitution does not mandate that counselors who learn of a 
minor’s pregnancy disclose this information to her parents.114  
In New York – like many other states – no law requires the 
disclosure of the names of pregnant students to parents or 
school officials.115 
When confronted with a difficult decision or a 
challenging situation many adolescents do, in fact, seek the 
advice and support of at least one parent on their own.  For 
example, studies show that for the majority of adolescents who 
choose to have an abortion, at least one parent knows about 
their decision, even those who live in states without parental 
involvement laws.116  One study revealed that eighty-six 
percent of pregnant minors confided in their mothers before 
they made the decision whether to have an abortion.117  Ninety 
  
 113 See Port Wash. Teachers’ Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ. of the Port Wash. Union 
Free Sch. Dist., 361 F. Supp. 2d 69, 81 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); see, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (holding that parents have the right to refuse to educate some 
children based on religion and stating that the “primary role of parents in the 
upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American 
tradition”); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (granting parents the 
power to direct their children’s education); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) 
(holding that parents have a right to “establish a home and bring up children”). 
 114 See Arnold v. Bd. of Educ. of Escambia County, Ala., 880 F.2d 305 (11th 
Cir. 1989). 
 115 Student Pregnancies Are Not Reportable, supra note 80.  
 116 Stanley K. Henshaw & Kathryn Kost, Parental Involvement in Minors’ 
Abortion Decisions, 24 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 196, 199 (1992) (finding that 61% of 
pregnant minors informed at least one parent).  Other studies had similar results.  A 
study of 432 unmarried women seventeen years of age or younger whose unintended 
pregnancy resulted in birth or abortion revealed that 57% involved their parents, 
typically their mother, in their decision whether to have an abortion or continue with 
their pregnancy. Id. at 196 (citing R. H. Rosen, Adolescent Pregnancy Decision-Making: 
Are Parents Important?, 15 ADOLESCENCE 43 (1990)).  The numbers were 
approximately the same for those who decided to give birth as it was for those opting to 
terminate their pregnancy.  Id. 
  In another study, 51% of pregnant minors told their parents about their 
abortion decision. Mary S. Griffin-Carlson & Kathleen J. Mackin, Parental Consent: 
Factors Influencing Adolescent Disclosure Regarding Abortion, 28 ADOLESCENCE 1, 6 
(1993). An older national survey found that 55% of unmarried minors having an 
abortion said their parents knew of their decision, and the younger the minor, the more 
likely her parents knew of her choice. Henshaw & Kost, supra, at 196 (citing A. Torres 
et al., Telling Parents: Clinic Policies and Adolescents’ Use of Family Planning and 
Abortion Services, 12 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 284, 287 (1980)). See also Adolescent Right to 
Confidential Care, supra note 111, at 747 (stating that minors do not make their 
abortion decision in isolation, with the majority voluntarily including at least one 
parent in their decision). 
 117 Laurie Zabin et al., To Whom Do Inner-City Minors Talk About Their 
Pregnancies? Adolescents’ Communications with Parents and Parent Surrogates, 23 
FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 148, 150 (1992). 
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percent of pregnant adolescents living with their mothers 
revealed their pregnancies to her.118  In fact, the younger the 
pregnant adolescent, the more likely the parents knew of the 
minor’s choice to have an abortion.119  Of those who decided not 
to involve a parent, over half were seventeen years old and only 
two percent were younger than fifteen.120  Moreover, those 
minors who do not inform their parents almost always tell at 
least one responsible adult, other than clinic staff, such as 
another relative, teacher, counselor, professional, or a clergy 
member.121 
As previously discussed, experts agree that parental 
involvement in sensitive areas, such as pregnancy and 
abortion, should be encouraged and not forced upon a minor.122  
A report by the American Medical Association found that 
“[w]hile parental involvement in the medical care of children is 
always important and is generally necessary for significant 
medical procedures. . . in certain circumstances, parental 
involvement can be counterproductive and, unless required by 
law, should not be mandatory.”123  In one study, those who 
chose not to discuss their abortion decision with their parents 
gave four reasons for not confiding: fear of rejection, fear of 
disappointing their parents, wanting to spare their parents 
from the problem, and wanting to handle it on their own.124  In 
  
 118 Id. at 151. The researchers report that a “few had cited another individual 
as the person to whom they were responsible.” Id. 
 119 See, e.g., Adolescent’s Right to Confidential Care, supra note 111, at 748 
(claiming that very young adolescents almost always voluntarily involve their parents); 
Griffin-Carlson & Mackin, supra note 116, at 6.  A 1980 study found that 72% of 
minors fifteen years of age or younger discussed their abortion decision with their 
parents. Aida Torres et al., Telling Parents: Clinic Policies and Adolescents’ Use of 
Family Planning and Abortion Services, 12 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 284, 288 (1980). 
 120 Henshaw & Kost, supra note 116, at 206. 
 121 Adolescent Right to Confidential Care, supra note 111, at 747.  One study 
found that 95% of pregnant adolescents consulted at least one adult, whether a parent, 
surrogate parent, or some other adult.  Zabin et al., supra note 117, at 151. 
 122 Mandatory Parental Consent to Abortion, supra note 110, at 83-84 (citing a 
National Research Council study that concluded that adolescents should be 
encouraged, not required, to involve their parents in their abortion decision). The 
American Medical Association, the American Public Health Association, and the 
Society for Adolescent Medicine agree.  See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 123 Mandatory Parental Consent to Abortion, supra note 110, at 82 (citing 
COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, 
CONFIDENTIAL CARE FOR MINORS, IN PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 198-
205  (1992)). 
 124 Griffin-Carlson & Mackin, supra note 116, at 8. See, e.g., Adolescent Right 
to Confidential Care, supra note 111, at 748 (explaining that although parental 
involvement may sometimes be beneficial, in other cases it may be punitive, coercive, 
 
2005] PLEASE DON’T TELL MY PARENTS 579 
 
fact, minors who strongly oppose informing their parents of 
their pregnancy usually predict their parents’ reactions 
correctly.125 
Furthermore, the policy is not necessary to improve 
familial communications.  In fact, such disclosures can lead to 
child abuse of pregnant teens.126  It is the unfortunate truth 
that, for some teenagers, “the home falls far short of [the] ideal 
and may be a place of physical abuse and neglect and 
psychological maltreatment.”127  As a Justice of the California 
Supreme Court commented, “[n]ot every pregnant adolescent 
has parents out of the comforting and idyllic world of Norman 
Rockwell.”128  It is reasonable for some adolescents to fear 
physical abuse from one or both parents upon disclosure of 
their pregnancies.129  For girls in these homes, parental 
involvement in their pregnancies does not serve their best 
interests.  Unfortunately, in families with a history of domestic 
violence and dysfunction, domestic abuse is at its worst during 
a family member’s pregnancy, after recent childbirth, or during 
the adolescence of the family’s children.130  Indeed, one-third of 
adolescents who decide not to disclose their pregnancy to their 
parents are already victims of child abuse and fear it will 
reoccur.131 
  
or abusive) (citing Patricia Donovan, Judging Teenagers: How Minors Fare When They 
Seek Court-Authorized Abortions, 15 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 259 (1983)). 
  Another reason is that some minors do not want to reveal their pregnancy 
to their parents in fear that their parents will force them to have an abortion. Henshaw 
& Kost, supra note 116, at 204. Surprisingly, while many supporters of parental 
notification requirements believe that parental involvement will help persuade the 
minor not to have an abortion, studies have shown the opposite to be true. Robert Wm. 
Blum et al., Factors Associated with the Use of Court Bypass to Minors to Obtain 
Abortions, 22 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 158, 160 (1990) (citing R. Rosen et al., Help or 
Hindrance: Parental Impact on Pregnant Teenagers’ Resolution Decisions, 31 FAM. REL. 
271 (1982)). In fact, the Henshaw and Kost study reveals that nearly one-fifth of 
minors whose parents found out about their pregnancy from a third party were forced 
to undergo an abortion, and most parents – more than ninety percent – believe that an 
abortion is in their daughters’ best interest. Henshaw & Kost, supra note 116, at 204. 
 125 Adolescent Right to Confidential Care, supra note 111, at 748 (citing Brief 
for Petitioners at 13-16, Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 422 (1989) (Nos. 88-1125 
& 88-1309)). 
 126 See infra notes 127-39 and accompanying text. 
 127 Mandatory Parental Consent to Abortion, supra note 110, at 83. 
 128 Loxterman, supra note 108 (citing Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 912 
P.2d 1148, 1171 (Cal. 1996) (Kennard, J., dissenting), vacated, 940 P.2d 797 (Cal. 
1997)). 
 129 Mandatory Parental Consent to Abortion, supra note 110, at 83. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Adolescent Right to Confidential Care, supra note 111, at 748. 
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Parental reaction to a daughter’s pregnancy is more 
severe when the daughter does not disclose the pregnancy 
herself.132  When parents learn of a daughter’s pregnancy from 
someone other than their daughter, fifty-eight percent of these 
pregnant teens reported at least one adverse consequence 
stemming from their parents’ knowledge of their pregnancy.133  
At least six percent suffered from “relatively harmful 
consequences – physical violence in the home, being beaten, 
being forced to leave home or having the health of their parents 
affected.”134  In fact, compared with minors who voluntarily 
disclose their pregnancy to their parents, minors whose parents 
learned of their pregnancy from another source were two to 
four times as likely to face adverse consequences.135 
Blanket parental notification policies will place some 
pregnant students in immediate physical and psychological 
danger.  Without an exception for these situations, a parental 
notification policy will cause these students serious harm.  
However, a case-by-case determination of whether the school 
should disclose the student’s pregnancy to her parents does not 
offer the student adequate protection.  In addition to potential 
physical abuse, the American Medical Association warns that 
“[d]isclosure of the pregnancy may also cause serious emotional 
harm to the minor” since “[p]arental notification often 
precipitates a family crisis, characterized by severe parental 
anger and rejection of the minor.”136  Because child abuse 
victims may not reveal their abuse to their health care 
providers, specific safe harbors in mandatory notification 
policies will not be enough.137  Additionally, for other pregnant 
adolescents, parental involvement with their pregnancy may 
cause the first instance of physical abuse.  Some may also 
experience psychological abuse that is extremely harmful, yet 
not serious enough to fall under child abuse statutes.138  
Unfortunately, parental notification laws cannot transform 
  
 132 Henshaw & Kost, supra note 116, at 207. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Mandatory Parental Consent to Abortion, supra note 110, at 83 (citing J.D. 
Osofsky & H.J. Osofsky, Teenage Pregnancy: Psychosocial Considerations, 21 CLINICAL 
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1161, 1165 (1978)). 
 137 Id. at 84 (explaining that victims of domestic violence are 
“characteristically secretive about the abuse they have suffered, and minors are 
particularly reluctant to reveal the existence of abuse in their homes”) (citing Hodgson 
v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 769 (D. Minn. 1986), aff’d, 497 U.S. 417 (1990)). 
 138 Henshaw & Kost, supra note 116, at 196. 
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dysfunctional family environments into stable homes.139  For 
the many teenagers living in these environments, parental 
notification policies are of limited benefit, if beneficial at all. 
Moreover, there is “no evidence that mandatory 
parental involvement results in the benefits to the family 
intended by the legislation.”140  In fact, no studies have revealed 
that disclosure improves familial communications.141  While it 
is true that a parent may provide additional points of view for 
the minor to consider when making her abortion decision, 
research shows that most adolescents are capable of making 
reasonable decisions regarding their pregnancies, including 
whether parental involvement would be beneficial.142  In fact, 
older minors143 “appear as mature as adults in their decision 
making processes and abilities.”144  Most fourteen- to seventeen-
year-olds have the competency of adults to consent to an 
abortion and are able to “understand the risks and benefits of 
their options for resolving an unplanned pregnancy and to 
make a voluntary, independent decision.”145  One study 
revealed that all minors who considered abortion – along with 
older minors who did not – possess decision-making 
competence comparable to adults.146  Another study found that 
the adolescent’s satisfaction regarding her abortion decision 
was not related to whether she confided in mother.147 
  
 139 Loxterman, supra note 108. 
 140 Adolescent’s Right to Confidential Care, supra note 111, at 748. 
 141 Id.  As the New Jersey Supreme Court articulated, “parental notification 
laws cannot transform a household with poor lines of communication into a paradigm 
of the perfect American family.”  Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 762 A.2d 
620, 637 (N.J. 2002). 
 142 LEVESQUE, supra note 43, at 114. Indeed “[n]o research suggests that 
minors over the age of 13 are unable to make reasoned decisions.” Id.  Furthermore, 
those who do not disclose their pregnancy to their parents usually seek the advice of 
another adult. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text (discussing how most 
adolescents discuss their pregnancy with at least one adult). 
 143 Older minors are defined as those aged fourteen through seventeen.  
Levesque, supra note 43, at 114. 
 144 Id. (citing Gary B. Melton, Knowing What We Do Know:  APA and 
Adolescent Abortion, 45 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1171, 1172 (1990)). 
 145 P. Donovan, Most Minors Are Mature Enough to Make Their Own Abortion 
Decision, 24 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 187, 187 (1992) (citing B. Ambuel & J. Rappaport, 
Developmental Trends in Adolescents’ Psychological and Legal Competence to Consent 
to Abortion, 16 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 129 (1992)). 
 146 Id. at 188. The only minors who were considered less competent than 
adults were those aged fifteen or younger who did not consider abortion. Id. 
 147 Zabin et al., supra note 117, at 153. Instead, for the minors who discussed 
their pregnancy with their mothers, satisfaction was based on whether their mother 
approved of and supported their decision. Id. 
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While some minors may, arguably, not be mature 
enough to make a decision regarding whether to terminate her 
pregnancy or carry it to term, minors also seek surrogate 
parents or other trusted adults to help them make these 
decisions.148  The fact that some minors may not be mature 
enough to make an abortion decision on their own is all the 
more reason to establish policies that promote the use of 
school-based health care providers so students will voluntarily 
involve adults in their abortion decision.  Thus, schools should 
promise confidentiality instead of implementing measures that 
scare minors away from taking advantage of available 
resources.149  Once a student sits down with a counselor or 
nurse, the professional is in the best position to encourage her 
to discuss her pregnancy with her parents.150 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
School boards should not implement policies that 
mandate school-based health care providers – and teachers and 
other staff, for that matter – to disclose the names of pregnant 
students to third parties, including school officials and the 
minors’ parents.  Confidentiality policies comply with students’ 
constitutional and statutory rights and effectuate sound public 
policy.  Schools should actively encourage students to seek 
counseling and treatment from school-based health care 
providers.  In doing so, clear guidelines must be established to 
articulate the rights of students in regard to confidential health 
care at school and the duty of school-based health care 
professionals to protect these communications. 
With consideration of the sensitive nature of pregnancy, 
local boards of education should take affirmative steps to 
protect the rights of pregnant students.  Since many well-
meaning educators are uninformed about the legal rights of 
students, clear guidelines regarding these rights should be 
established and disseminated to school officials, school-based 
health care professionals, faculty, and staff.  Indeed, guidelines 
clarifying students’ rights to confidential medical and mental 
health care help prevent the implementation of policies that 
infringe upon the liberties of pregnant adolescents. 
  
 148 See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 149 See supra Part IV.A. 
 150 See infra notes 158-60 and accompanying text. 
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For example, the Los Angeles Unified School District 
issued a bulletin that articulates the policies and programs 
relating to pregnant students.151  The bulletin explains that the 
“District recognizes and protects the educational rights of 
pregnant and parenting students as it does the rights of all 
other students.”152  An entire section is devoted to informing 
school officials about confidentiality protections, including 
situations involving a student’s pregnancy.153  The bulletin 
explains that, based upon California law, pregnant and 
parenting students have the right to have “their health and 
personal information kept confidential”154 and that the minor’s 
decision regarding whether to inform others, including her 
parents, about her pregnancy is “left solely up to the pregnant 
student.”155  Indeed, the bulletin clearly explains that students 
must consent to any third-party disclosures, including to school 
administrators and staff, unless otherwise required by law.156 
Policies articulating the confidentiality rights of 
pregnant students should inform school-based health care 
providers that, consistent with the advice of leading medical 
authorities, students should be encouraged to disclose their 
pregnancy to their parents, but not compelled.157  School-based 
health care officials should “explain [to students] how parental 
involvement can be helpful and that parents are generally very 
understanding and supportive.”158  If the minor is reluctant to 
disclose her pregnancy to her parents, the provider should 
“ensure that the minor’s reluctance is not based on any 
  
 151 LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCH. DIST., BULLETIN NO. Z-65 (REV.), PREGNANT 
AND PARENTING STUDENTS (2001), available at http://www.lausd.k12.ca.us/lausd/ 
offices/eec/pdfs/prgparnt.pdf [hereinafter LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCH. DIST. BULLETIN]. 
See also CAL. WOMEN’S LAW CTR., CALIFORNIA MODEL POLICY ON THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF 
PREGNANT AND PARENTING STUDENTS (2003), available at http://www.cwlc.org/ 
newsarticles/03_mod_pol_ca.pdf [hereinafter CALIFORNIA MODEL POLICY] (encouraging 
schools to adopt comprehensive policies on the rights of pregnant and parenting teens 
and assisting schools in this effort by drafting a model policy). 
 152 LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCH. DIST. BULLETIN, supra note 151, at 1.  The 
District finds this protection from Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 and 
the California Education Code. Id. 
 153 Id. at 4. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. 
 157 See supra note 123 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Mandatory Parental 
Consent to Abortion, supra note 110, at 84. The Los Angeles Unified School District 
Bulletin explains that counselors should encourage students to disclose their 
pregnancy to their parents, but that such a disclosure “may not be coerced or forced.” 
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCH. DIST. BULLETIN, supra note 151, at 4. 
 158 Mandatory Parental Consent to Abortion, supra note 110, at 84. 
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misperceptions about the likely consequences of parental 
involvement.”159  However, as previously discussed, minors are 
in the best position to determine for themselves whether 
parental involvement is beneficial and must not be compelled 
to disclose their pregnancy to their parents.160 
The policies created to protect the rights of students’ 
confidentiality should also encourage school-based health care 
professionals to fully explain confidentiality requirements to 
students in order to promote candid discussions between the 
student and her provider.  Indeed, assurances of confidentiality 
“increase adolescents’ willingness to discuss sensitive topics 
related to sexuality, substance use, and mental health and 
increase adolescents’ willingness to return for future health 
care.”161  Moreover, the provider should consider disclosing any 
limitations on confidentiality.162  In doing so, school-based 
health care providers should also “explain [the] important 
aspects of their professional relationship[] in a clear, 
understandable manner that is appropriate to [the student’s] 
age and ability to understand,” including the reasons why 
particular information, such as pregnancy status, is being 
requested and the possible outcomes regarding disclosure.163 
Resources are available to help school boards implement 
policies that protect students’ rights.  Non-profit organizations 
are able to assist school districts and local governments in 
drafting comprehensive guidelines articulating the rights of 
students.  For example, the California Women’s Law Center 
drafted a model policy on the civil rights of pregnant and 
  
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. at 84-86 (explaining that professionals should “not feel or be compelled 
to require minors to involve their parents before deciding whether to undergo an 
abortion” and that the minor should decide whether parental involvement is advisable). 
See supra Part IV.B; see also Adolescent’s Right to Confidential Care, supra note 111, at 
750. 
 161 Influence of Physician Confidentiality Assurances, supra note 105, at 1033.  
 162 Id. (discussing the pros and cons of disclosing any limitations on 
confidentiality).  Indeed, some professional organizations have specified guidelines for 
their members to follow regarding discussing the limits of confidentiality with patients.  
See, e.g., AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOC., ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND 
CODE OF CONDUCT § 4.02 (effective date June 1, 2003), available at 
http://www.apa.org/ethics/code2002.html#4 (establishing guidelines for discussing the 
limits of confidentiality with patients); AM. COUNSELING ASSOC., ACA CODE OF ETHICS 
AND STANDARDS OF PRACTICE § B.1.g (adopted in 1996), available at 
http://www.cacd.org/codeofethics.html#eb (same). 
 163 NAT’L ASSOC. OF SCH. PSYCHOLOGISTS, PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT MANUAL 
FOR SCHOOL PSYCHOLOGY § III.B.2 (2000), available at http://www.nasponline.org/ 
pdf/ProfessionalCond.pdf [hereinafter PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT MANUAL FOR SCHOOL 
PSYCHOLOGY]. 
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parenting students.164  Other organizations, such as the New 
York Civil Liberties Union, have in the past offered to help 
school boards and administrators create policies mindful of 
students’ rights.165 
Once clear guidelines about the protection of students’ 
confidential communications are established, school officials 
need to educate school administrators, school-based health care 
providers, faculty, and staff regarding these policies.166  
Training should be provided to explain the nature of students’ 
rights and precisely which communications are covered.167  
Again, civil rights and women’s organizations are often 
available to work with public officials and school 
administrators to develop proper training.168 
In addition, students’ confidential communications 
should be kept in a separate file, apart from their academic 
records, to avoid inadvertent disclosure.169  School officials 
should encourage confidentiality among their staff and by not 
asking providers about confidential information about 
  
 164 CALIFORNIA MODEL POLICY, supra note 151 (encouraging schools to adopt 
comprehensive policies on the rights of pregnant and parenting teens and assisting 
schools in this effort by drafting a model policy); CAL. WOMEN’S LAW CTR., FEDERAL 
MODEL POLICY ON THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF PREGNANT AND PARENTING STUDENTS (2003), 
available at http://www.cwlc.org/newsarticles/03_mod_pol_fed.pdf (same). 
 165 Letter from Rebekah Diller & Anna Schissel, N.Y. Civil Liberties Union 
Reprod. Rights Project to Joel Klein, Chancellor, New York City Department of 
Education (May 8, 2003) (alleging that school officials violated female students’ rights 
by requiring them to undergo testing for pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases 
and offering to meet with the Chancellor “to discuss the implementation of appropriate 
policies and training regarding student privacy rights”), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/StudentsRights/StudentsRights.cfm?ID=13089&c=31 [hereinafter 
Letter to Chancellor Klein]. 
 166 See, e.g., Press Release, N.Y. Civil Liberties Union Reprod. Rights Project, 
NYCLU Gives Schools Chancellor Levy An “F” For Failing To Stop Discrimination 
Against Pregnant And Parenting Girls Who Are Trying To Stay In School (Mar. 23, 
2002), available at http://www.nyclu.org/boe032702.html (urging New York City’s 
Chancellor of Education to “implement immediate training of staff and faculty on the 
rights and needs of [pregnant] students” to prevent future discrimination). 
 167 Training will also help shield the municipality from liability under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to train school staff regarding the rights of pregnant students 
and protecting confidential communications. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2005). 
 168 Letter to Chancellor Klein, supra note 165, at 4 (offering to train school 
officials regarding student privacy rights).  Organizations have also created brochures 
and information packets regarding students’ rights for professionals to reference. See 
N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION REPROD. RIGHTS PROJECT, MINORS’ RIGHTS TO 
CONFIDENTIAL REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH CARE IN NEW YORK STATE (2003), 
http://www.nyclu.org/rrp_minorsrights.html. 
 169 See, e.g., STEWART W. EHLY, INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP COUNSELING IN 
SCHOOLS 154 (1989) (stating that “[s]chool practitioners who become involved with 
counseling assume the responsibility of maintaining confidentiality”). 
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students, such as which students are pregnant.170  Indeed, 
administrators must lead by example and refrain from 
attempting to discern such status.  Curiosity and gossip must 
give way to an appreciation of the principles of 
confidentiality.171 
The creation of student-friendly materials will help 
encourage students to utilize the expertise of school-based 
health care providers.  The materials should explain that 
communications are confidential and will not be disclosed to 
parents, school officials, teachers, or other students without 
their consent.172  Students must understand that confidential 
counseling regarding sensitive areas, such as pregnancy, 
remains confidential.  As a result, students will feel more 
comfortable receiving treatment from school-based health care 
providers and will disclose the information needed to receive 
quality care. 
Finally, school officials must treat disclosure of a 
student’s confidential communications as a serious violation of 
the student’s rights and, when appropriate, initiate 
disciplinary action.  School-based health care professionals 
must not be compelled to disclose such communications, unless 
required by law, and those who exert pressure on these 
providers should be provided with information about students’ 
privacy rights.  In some cases, those who reveal confidential 
communications should face disciplinary action.173 
  
 170 See, e.g., id. at 151 (explaining that the “educator who becomes involved 
has a responsibility to keep confidences”). 
 171 The Professional Conduct Manual for School Psychology of the National 
Association of School Psychologists explains that ethical standards require that 
“[s]chool psychologists discuss confidential information only for professional purposes 
and only with persons who have a legitimate need to know.” PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
MANUAL FOR SCHOOL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 163, at § III.A.10. 
 172 See, e.g., ACLU OF N. CAL., WE HAVE RIGHTS TOO! (2003), available at 
http://www.aclunc.org/students/guide/ (explaining some of students’ most important 
rights, including health and medical care); N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION REPROD. 
RIGHTS PROJECT, THE RIGHTS OF PREGNANT & PARENTING TEENS: A GUIDE TO THE LAW 
IN NEW YORK STATE, available at http://www.nyclu.org/rrp_rppt1.html (last visited 
Sept. 11, 2005); N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION REPROD. RIGHTS PROJECT, TEENAGERS, 
HEALTH CARE & THE LAW: A GUIDE TO THE LAW ON MINORS’ RIGHTS IN NEW YORK 
STATE (2002), available at http://www.nyclu.org/health1.html. 
 173 In fact, requiring school-based health care providers to disclose confidential 
information may subject them to liability or disciplinary action for professional 
misconduct.  Indeed, in many states, health care professionals must follow the rules of 
privileged communications.  For example, New York law requires those authorized to 
practice medicine, registered professional nursing, licensed practical nursing, 
psychologists, and certified social workers to keep the communications with their 
patients confidential.  Therefore, health and mental health professionals, including 
those based in the school, who reveal personal information obtained in a professional 
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Guidelines and training will help the school community 
understand the rights of pregnant students and the importance 
of protecting confidential communications.  This, in turn, will 
encourage more students to utilize school-based medical and 
mental health services.  As a result, professionals will be able 
to encourage students to discuss their pregnancy with their 
parents, and serve as a supportive, informed parent surrogate 
in the limited cases where the adolescent chooses not to 
disclose. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
School boards should refrain from implementing 
mandatory notification policies.  Notwithstanding Port 
Washington Teachers’ Association, such policies violate the 
Constitution and state law.  Furthermore, mandatory 
notification policies simply do not effectuate sound public 
policy.  Instead of encouraging students to talk to responsible 
adults about their pregnancy, notification policies will deter 
students from utilizing health care professionals.  As an 
alternative to enacting a mandatory notification policy that 
infringes upon the rights of students, school boards are advised 
to implement formal confidentiality policies and train faculty 
and staff regarding confidential communications.  School-based 
health care professionals are not able to help students if they 
do not know about the pregnancy, and they will not know about 
the pregnancy unless students are promised that their inner-
most thoughts and problems will be protected from disclosure 




capacity without the prior consent of the patient or when not required by law to 
disclose, may be subject to fines, reprimands or revocation of a license and may be sued 
by a patient for damages resulting from the confidentiality breach.  N.Y. COMP. CODES 
R. & REGS. tit. 8 §§ 29.1-29.2 (2005); N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 6509(9), 6511 (McKinney 
2005); Anderson v. Strong Memorial Hosp., 531 N.Y.S.2d 735, 739 (N.Y. Gen. Term 
1988); MacDonald v. Clinger, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801, 802 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). 
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